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In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors argue that the current
crisis is the perfect time to make revenueraising reforms to state corporate income taxes
— reforms that would have been desirable
policy improvements even during an
economic upturn, but that are even more
clearly good policy moves in light of the
current and upcoming state economic and
budgetary crises.

dollars in aid. The arguments against such aid,
including the claim that the states have somehow
2
been profligate, do not stand up to scrutiny.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the federal
government will do enough,3 and it is already the
case that the federal government is acting too
slowly. States and local governments, which
generally operate under balanced budget
constraints, are, accordingly, already making
4
sweeping cuts that will deepen the recession and
reduce services when they are most needed.
Rather than make these cuts, it would be better
5
to raise taxes on those that can afford to pay. In
this essay, we will focus on one such set of
taxpayers — large multinational corporations that
have long circumvented both the state and federal
corporate income taxes. Better yet, the reforms we
propose represent good tax policy more generally:
They are fair, efficient, and administrable. This
essay is a contribution to Project SAFE: “State
6
Action in Fiscal Emergencies” — an academic
effort to help states weather the COVID-19
economic crisis by providing policy
recommendations backed by research.

1

See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, “Disaster Relief to States and Cities Is
Both Right and Good: Part 1 of 2,” Verdict, May 14, 2020; Buchanan,
“Disaster Relief to States and Cities Is Both Right and Good: Part 2 of 2,”
Verdict, May 18, 2020.
2

Richard C. Auxier, “McConnell’s Attempt to Blame States for
COVID-19 Budget Shortfalls Is Wrong and Dangerous,” Urban Institute
and Brookings Institution, Tax Policy Center, Apr. 24, 2020. Needless to
say, there is also extraordinary hypocrisy given that the president and his
congressional allies approved deficit-exploding tax cuts during an
economic expansion.
3

Emily Cochrane, “GOP Split Over State Aid That Could Mostly Go
to Democratic Strongholds,” The New York Times, May 11, 2020.
4

I. Introduction
The federal government should be providing
states and localities with hundreds of billions of

Amanda Albright, “States, Cities Cut Payrolls by Nearly 1 Million
Over Shutdown,” Bloomberg, May 8, 2020.
5

David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the
Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010). See also Gamage and
Darien Shanske, “States Should Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms,”
Tax Notes State, May 18, 2020, p. 859.
6

See Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471.
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Before proceeding, a skeptic might note that
state corporate income taxes represent only
about 3 percent of state taxes, or about $53 billion
7
per year, while estimates of the states’ need
8
9
range from $500 billion to $1 trillion. There is no
question that the reforms we propose in this
essay will not raise $500 billion. Nevertheless, all
the reforms we propose have the potential to
raise substantial amounts of revenue. For
instance, moving to worldwide combination has
been reasonably estimated to have the potential
to raise about $17 billion per year for the states.10
That is a substantial amount on its own. Several
of the other reforms below are of similar
magnitude. Our back-of-the-envelope estimate
for a deemed repatriation tax, outlined below,
indicates a revenue potential for the states as
high as $25 billion, or even significantly higher.

To be sure, the recession might suppress some of
these projections, but maybe not by that much,
given that some firms are going to be very
profitable during this pandemic. Further, if
states put these reforms in place now, their
revenues will not only bounce back faster, but
they may be able to borrow against this
11
anticipated future revenue right now.
That the numbers here can be large should
not be too surprising; the yield of the state
corporate income tax has fallen sharply over the
last few decades, even relative to the decline in
federal corporate income taxes. In a sense, the
reforms we propose would serve to partially
restore the state corporate income tax bases to
their prior levels.
For those still skeptical, here is another —
albeit noisy — data point regarding the money
that most states have left on the table, from New
Jersey’s experience:

7

U.S. Census Bureau, “2017 State & Local Government Finance
Historical Datasets and Tables” (last revised Oct. 30, 2019).
8

National Governors Association, “National Governors Association
Outlines Need for ‘Additional and Immediate’ Fiscal Assistance to
States,” Apr. 11, 2020.
9

Cochrane, supra note 3.

10

Richard Phillips and Nathan Proctor, “A Simple Fix for a $17
Billion Loophole: How States Can Reclaim Revenue Lost to Tax Havens,”
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (Jan. 17, 2019).
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We will explore how states might do this in a further essay.
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This chart demonstrates some extraordinary
growth in New Jersey’s corporate income tax after
it passed several sensible reforms: In 2018 the
state conformed to the global intangible lowtaxed income regime under the federal Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act of 2017, taxed 5 percent of the
repatriation, moved to combined reporting (for
2019), and imposed a 2.5 percent corporate
income tax surcharge for 2018 and 2019 (1.5
percent for 2020-21). To be sure, the actual 2020
numbers are likely to be quite a bit lower because
of the pandemic, and there are any number of
other factors that bespeak caution in extrapolating
too far from one state’s experience. Nevertheless,
we think this chart indicates that — consistent
with other data, some of which we discuss below
— the state corporate income tax can be reformed
in sensible ways that yield significant revenue.
It is not a good thing, in our view, that the
states have let their corporate income taxes wither
so that there is so much to be gained from
straightforward reforms. However, in the current

crisis this represents an opportunity. The states
need only engage in some ordinary good tax
housekeeping to revive their corporate income
taxes. Though there may well be a need for
stronger medicine that that at some point, it
makes sense to start with reforms that are easy
and practical.
The reforms we propose, in a thumbnail
sketch, are as follows:
12
1. Tax the repatriation: Multinational
corporations stashed $2 trillion in profits
abroad. Many of those profits were earned in
the United States and should have been taxed
by the states.

12

For a more in-depth version of this argument, see Shanske and
Gamage, “Why (and How) States Should Tax the Repatriation,” State Tax
Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 317.
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13

2. Shift to mandatory worldwide combination:
Multinational corporations are still shifting
domestic profits abroad. The states can counter
this by (reasonably) including these foreign
subsidiaries in their corporate tax base.
14
3. Conform to GILTI: The TCJA made a halfhearted attempt to combat income shifting.
Though moving to worldwide combination
would be better, conforming to GILTI at the
state level is the least a state should do.
4. Income tax surcharge: A handful of major
corporations will likely be very profitable over
the next few years. States should add a
temporary income tax surcharge to tax some of
these profits.
5. Suspend some tax credits: States have been
generous in giving large corporations credits
from the corporate income tax. Credits of this
magnitude were probably never a good idea,
but given the current crisis, it is a particularly
apt time to suspend these credits.
6. Reform the sales factor: States generally
divide the income of multijurisdictional
corporations based on their share of a
corporation’s sales in the state. Some taxpayers
have gotten good at manipulating the location
of sales, but there are ways to make the formula
harder to game.
7. Expand the corporate income tax to include
all large businesses: There has been a shift to the
use of noncorporate business entities for
decades. It has never made sense that only
corporations pay taxes at the entity level. This
should be corrected.
II. The Repatriation
Under the international tax law regime that
ended in 2018, the United States — at least
nominally — sought to tax the profits of
multinational corporations on the basis of their

worldwide income. At the same time, the regime
permitted U.S.-based multinationals to defer
payment of tax on profits earned overseas until
that money was brought home. Until a foreign
subsidiary repatriated its profits to its U.S. parent,
the profits were not subject to U.S. tax. Naturally,
large multinational corporations left a lot of
money — over $2 trillion15 — stashed abroad.
Much of that money represented profits on
sales to U.S. residents and profits from the sale of
intellectual property developed in the United
States. Under the prior tax regime, U.S.-based
multinationals deployed several well-known
techniques to strip the profits from sales to U.S.
customers and avoid being taxed on those profits
by U.S. tax agencies, either federal or state. Those
profits were then secreted abroad to escape tax.
The TCJA deemed all the deferred income
repatriated and subject to tax. But it then applied
special low tax rates to these profits, effectively
exempting most of the profits from tax. Even
worse, the new rules governing net operating
losses under the CARES Act will allow some of
the taxpayers that did pay tax on the repatriation
to get those taxes back.16
But all is not lost: States can still tax this
deemed repatriation,17 and they can then use that
money to keep the lights on during this recession.
Most state corporate tax laws did not and do not
reach the repatriation, but these laws can be
changed to do so. Alternatively, and perhaps even
better, state governments should subject the
repatriation to a special one-time tax surcharge.
There are many reasons why taxing the
repatriation is a particularly good way for state
governments to raise desperately needed
revenue. Consider just four, below.
First, states would be recouping a national
loss. The repatriated profits of multinational firms
reflect a form of national savings that is now being
squandered. While these profits went untaxed for
years and years, other taxpayers picked up the
slack, and critical national initiatives went

13

For further development of this argument, see Shanske, “White
Paper on Eliminating the Water’s Edge Election and Moving to
Mandatory Worldwide Combined Reporting,” State Tax Notes, Sept. 17,
2018, p. 1181.
14

For further development of this argument, see Shanske and
Gamage, “Why States Should Tax the GILTI,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 4,
2019, p. 751; Shanske and Gamage, “Why States Can Tax the GILTI,”
State Tax Notes, Mar. 18, 2019, p. 967; Shanske and Gamage, “States
Should Conform to GILTI, Part 3: Elevator Pitch and Q&A,” Tax Notes
State, Oct. 14, 2019, p. 121.
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15

Jeff Sommer, “A Stranded $2 Trillion Overseas Stash Gets Closer to
Coming Home,” The New York Times, Nov. 4, 2016.
16

Assuming this is the best use for those net operating losses. See
Josiah P. Child et al., “A Silver Linings Guidebook: Corporate Planning
for Coronavirus Losses,” Tax Notes Federal, May 18, 2020, p. 1159.
17

Shanske and Gamage, “Will States Step Up in 2020? We Hope So,”
Tax Notes State, Dec. 16, 2019, p. 977.
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unfunded. Now, as the money returns home, its
value to the rest of us has been gutted by low tax
rates and the predictable use of the repatriated
revenues for corporate stock repurchases rather
than job creation.18
Second, much of the untaxed profits
squirreled abroad also escaped state-level taxes.
Thus, for states, taxing these repatriated profits
reflects satisfaction of an overdue tax bill avoided
for years.
Third, since the relevant profits were earned
previously and then largely went untaxed, taxing
them now should not undesirably affect the
corporations’ behavior or their competitive
position.
Fourth, though we cannot offer precise
revenue estimates, subjecting the repatriation to
tax can raise large sums of money, which makes
sense because even a small slice of $2 trillion is a
large number.
Here is a back-of-the-envelope estimate as to
the potential for state revenue. Though we think
that the states can tax all of the repatriation, let’s
suppose instead that they tax the 84 percent of the
repatriation that many taxpayers have not yet
paid tax on at the federal level because the federal
tax law gave them a backloaded deferred
19
payment option. That leaves only $1.6 trillion.
Now states need to estimate what percentage of
that revenue was shifted out of the United States
and what percentage was really earned abroad. A
defensible estimate, based on the relative size of
U.S. GDP and empirical work on how much
income is shifted out of the United States relative
to other countries,20 might arrive at 35 percent.
That leaves us with about $560 billion to be taxed.
We think a rate as high as 20 percent could be
justified given the taxes these taxpayers avoided
over the years, but suppose instead the states
went for the approximate median state corporate
income tax rate of 5 percent. This would still raise
$25 billion for the states.

III. Mandatory Worldwide Combination
The states have long confronted the problem
of how to tax the income of a multistate business.
In general, as a matter of constitutional law, each
state can only tax income generated in the state,
but how does one calculate that for an integrated
multistate business like a railroad or Apple? If one
asks the taxpayer to do the calculation, the
taxpayer will naturally argue that most of its
income is generated in a low-tax state or a no-tax
state.
The states arrived at an especially effective
solution to this problem. Instead of asking a
multistate business to divide up its income, the
states asked the business to report all of its
income, including income nominally earned
abroad, and then apportioned some of the income
to each state by means of a formula. The most
common modern formula uses the percentage of
sales within a state because, among other reasons,
the location of a firm’s customers is difficult to
game. So how much of Apple’s total income is
generated in a state under this system? The
answer is the same percentage as the percentage
of Apple’s sales in a state.
Note that this method — mandatory
worldwide combination — eliminates the
incentive to shift income to a low-tax jurisdiction.
It does not matter where the income is nominally
earned because it all goes in the same pot and is
multiplied by the usual formula (percentage of
sales) to apportion the income.
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld
21
mandatory worldwide combination twice.
Unfortunately, in the 1980s, our trading partners
pressured the federal government, which in turn
pressured the states, not to use mandatory
worldwide combination. Instead, states offered —
and still offer — multinational corporations what
is called a “water’s-edge” election, which, for the
most part, allows corporations not to combine
income earned abroad. Naturally, the availability
of a water’s-edge election encourages
multinational corporations to shift income abroad
to escape state taxation.

18

Michael Smolyansky, Gustavo Suarez, and Alexandra Tabova, “U.S.
Corporations’ Repatriation of Offshore Profits,” Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 4, 2018).
19

Section 965(h).

20

“Why States Can Tax the GILTI,” supra note 14, at nn.18, 19.

21

Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 321-31 (1994);
and Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 196
(1983).
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Eliminating this election should therefore
allow the states to tax a substantial portion of the
income that multinational corporations continue
to shift to low-tax jurisdictions. As noted above,
one respected estimate is that the states could
22
raise about $17 billion through moving to
worldwide combination.
IV. Conforming to GILTI
GILTI is a category of income that was added
to the federal tax code by the TCJA. GILTI was
nominally earned by the foreign subsidiary of a
U.S. corporation that the federal tax law deems to
really have been earned someplace else, such as
the United States. In other words, by means of a
formula, the federal corporate income tax uses
GILTI to combat the same income-shifting
problem that is the target of worldwide
combination.
Though there is some complexity, all a state
with a corporate income tax has to do is subject
GILTI to state corporate tax, and then that state is
also combatting income stripping. The state can
use the same formula to divide up the income of a
multinational corporation that it would ordinarily
use, more or less.
A state cannot conform to GILTI and adopt
worldwide combination; they are substitutes
because both are attempts to ferret out shifted
income. A state could offer taxpayers a choice
between them. As between worldwide and
GILTI, worldwide is better from the state’s
perceptive because it simply includes all the
income of a multinational corporation without
the intrusion of the complicated federal formula
for picking out suspect income. That said,
conforming to GILTI may well be easier
politically, as it requires little more than adding a
sentence to the state corporate income tax that
the state is taxing GILTI. That conformity would
raise a lot of revenue. The Penn Wharton Budget
Model estimates $382 billion in total GILTI for
23
2020. If the states were to follow the federal
government and tax half of GILTI and do so at a
5 percent rate, then the taxes would yield almost

See Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, supra note 10.

Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, “Global
Intangible Low-Taxed Income, 2020-2030: Estimates for the U.S. and
Massachusetts” (Feb. 25, 2020).
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V. Temporary Corporate Income Tax Surcharge
Many businesses will suffer losses during
this recession. A few will prosper. It is not
imposing a moral judgment to suggest that
businesses that do relatively well should pay
more in taxes to offset the increased budgetary
costs of the downturn. Put concretely, we may be
grateful to Amazon for its delivery service, but it
still seems appropriate to tax it on its profits so
that there will still be a main street when this is
all over. It might be particularly appealing to tax
a firm that is profiting during the recession on its
24
“excess” profits, but designing and
implementing a new tax would be a heavy
administrative lift for a state during a pandemic.
Fortunately, the regular corporate income tax
is already something of an excess profits tax, to
the extent that by definition it will only tax
profitable firms, and those firms are likely to be
more rare during the deep recession that we are
rapidly entering. As for those few profitable
firms, a temporarily higher corporate income tax
rate would reflect that we are now in a time
when putting a greater share of profits towards
the common good is especially urgent. For
instance, suppose that a state were to adopt a 3
percent corporate income tax surcharge for the
next three years. This could work to raise some
extra revenues in the depths of the recession
from those most able to pay. This surcharge
could be imposed only above a threshold, so as
to apply only to larger businesses that are

24

22
23

$10 billion annually. To be sure, this is a prepandemic estimate, like all the estimates we
provide, and the final number is likely to be less
during the recession. That granted, this would
still be sound tax policy, and the revenue will
likely remain substantial even during the
recession given that some firms, quite possibly
with a lot of GILTI, will remain profitable.

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “It’s Time to Revive the Excess Profits Tax,”
The American Prospect, Mar. 27, 2020. For further detail, see Avi-Yonah,
“Taxes in the Time of Coronavirus: Is It Time to Revive the Excess Profits
Tax?” University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 671, May
19, 2020.
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unlikely to face serious liquidity problems and
regarding which the corporate income tax can
25
also serve antitrust-related goals.
VI. Suspension of Some Corporate
Tax Credits and Deductions
States offer a multitude of tax credits. The
consensus is that these do little to encourage
economic development, but this is not the time to
fight that battle. What we want to emphasize is
that some tax credits have grown so large that
they are undermining the state corporate income
tax and could dramatically reduce the value of
these suggested reforms. Our primary target is
state R&D credits. These are expensive, costing
California alone almost $2 billion annually.26 That
is about 20 percent of all that California collects in
corporate income tax. Even worse, R&D credits
can be stockpiled. It is likely that many of the
taxpayers shifting profits have also been
stockpiling credits. We hope that a time will come
to reconsider state R&D credits more wholesale.
But, as with the temporary surcharge we
proposed above, states especially need to be able
to tax actors with greater ability to pay now, in this
economic downturn. R&D credits should thus be
suspended, for, say, three years.
VII. Reform the Sales Factor
As noted above, states have now shifted to
dividing up the income of a multinational
corporation by using a formula based on the
percentage of sales in a state. This approach has
turned out to be expensive. In 2015-16 — the last
time it calculated this number — California
27
estimated that it loses about $1 billion per year
because of this shift, about 10 percent of its total
corporate income tax collection. How can that be?
California is a big market state, after all. The
reason is that taxpayers have gotten very good at

25

Avi-Yonah and Lior Frank, “Antitrust and the Corporate Tax: Why
We Need Progressive Corporate Tax Rates,” Tax Notes Federal, May 18,
2020, p. 1199. Note that pairing progressive tax rates with a state
corporate tax base that has been successfully broadened through moving
to worldwide consolidation or conforming to GILTI would be a sensible
permanent reform.
26

California Department of Finance, “Tax Expenditure Report 2019-

gaming the sales factor. Reforming the sales factor
could therefore raise a lot of revenue, especially if
some of the other reforms listed above are also
28
adopted. We propose two reforms below.
First, states generally permit sales to be
located where a middleman — e.g., a wholesaler
— takes title to the goods. The problem with this
rule is that it encourages taxpayers to sell to
intermediaries in low-tax jurisdictions. The law of
the sales factor should thus be refined to
apportion a sale to its ultimate destination in all
cases, including sales of tangible personal
property. For example, a corporation could look to
information it retains in the usual course of
business, because surely businesses generally
know where their customers are. If the
corporation does not have this information and
cannot obtain it from its wholesalers, then it could
use any reasonable method, including
population, to fill in the gaps.
A second reform we propose to the sales factor
would be for corporations to be required to
submit an accounting of where they would locate
all their sales using the method they have used for
the state in question. The corporation should also
report where they are reporting sales to other
states with the single sales factor. It might not
seem odd to a California auditor, for instance, if
California’s sales factor for a corporation was only
8 percent — so a bit below the state’s share of U.S.
GDP — but it would rightfully raise alarm bells if
the disclosure of this method revealed a 10
percent sales factor for Nevada — or the Cayman
Islands.
VIII. Expand the Corporate Income
Tax to All Entities
There has been a shift over the last decades
from the corporate form; prominent
commentators link the shift to the decline in the
29
productivity of the state corporate income tax. In

28

A new essay with further details is to come, but if you can’t wait,
see: Avi-Yonah and Kimberly A. Clausing, “Toward a 21st-Century
International Tax Regime,” Tax Notes International, Aug. 26, 2019, p. 839,
846-47; Shanske, “Expanding State Fiscal Capacity, Part I: Combining an
Entity-Level Consumption Tax, Improved Sales Factor Apportionment,
and a Tax on a Federal Windfall (the QBI Deduction),” 22 Fla. Tax Rev.
448, 487-99 (2019).
29

20.”
27

California Department of Finance, “Tax Expenditure Report 2015-

16.”

William F. Fox and LeAnn Luna, “Do Limited Liability Companies
Explain Declining State Corporate Tax Revenues?” 33(6) Pub. Fin. Rev.
690, 715-16 (2005).
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any event, it does not make much sense for two
large business to be subject to different tax
regimes if one is a corporation and the other is not.
It could be argued that we would not want to pull
millions of small businesses into the corporate tax
regime, and that makes sense. Yet the corporate
tax could be extended to just the largest
noncorporate business with little loss of revenue.30
This is another example of a change that has long
made sense and could yield significant revenue,
especially as the economy improves.
IX. Conclusion
To start at the beginning, it is the federal
government that ought to be the prime mover in
this crisis. The fact that the states can raise
revenue through sensible reforms of their tax
systems should not be seen as somehow excusing
the (so-far) inadequate response at the federal
level. Yet, against the background of this federal
failure, the states should not compound the crisis
by engaging in cuts that hurt the least fortunate
before raising taxes on the more fortunate. And as
to raising taxes on those most able to pay, the
states should first seek to broaden their tax bases
to raise revenue from taxpayers who have long
avoided paying their fair share. This avoidance
has gone on for so long and through so many
channels that the states stand to gain substantial
revenue just by doing what they should have
done a long time ago.


30

Matthew J. Knittel and Susan C. Nelson, “How Would Small
Business Owners Fare Under a Business Entity Tax?” 64(4) Nat’l Tax J.
949, 974 (2011) (“Using a $10 million gross income and deduction test,
we find that 99 percent of the entities deemed a business (54 percent of
total filers) are also a small business, and they reported 18 percent of
total business income and 16 percent of net business income for tax year
2007”).
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